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BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM OF VAT RATES IN EUROPE 
RITA DE LA FERIA 
 
Within Europe differentiated rates structures date back to the introduction of VAT itself. 
Evidence as regards the negative consequences of applying multiple rates has been apparent for 
some decades.  In this context, since the late 1980s, there have been several attempts to amend 
European rates structures under the political guidance of the European Commission.  However, 
the most recent agreed upon amendments to the rates structure have increased the level of 
differentiation, rather than decreased it, with more goods and services being subject to reduced 
rates in Europe today than even as recently as ten years ago.  This reality seems to be changing 
in the last few years.  Since 2008 a staggering twenty-two of the twenty-eight EU Member State 
countries have increased their VAT rates, resulting in a broad convergence of VAT standard rates 
across the EU around the 21% mark.  Furthermore, there has also been a decrease in levels of 
differentiation with a reduction in number of VAT rates applicable in many Member States, as 
well as various base broadening measures.  The latest developments seem to indicate that 
conditions may be present which allow the reversal of the status quo bias, creating the 
opportunity for base broadening tax reform. This raises the possibility that European countries 
might engage in an involuntary process of convergence of VAT bases, fuelled by domestic 
necessities.  A politically achievable blueprint for reform of VAT rate structures in European is 
presented, which would result in a broader-based, and thus more efficient and neutral, VAT.  
Moreover, application of this blueprint across EU Member States would have the additional 
advantage of resulting in further convergence of VAT rate structures in Europe, to replace the 
long-sought, but so far unattainable, EU harmonisation. 
 
1. VAT Rates in Europe: 1967 to 20081 
                                                            
 Professor of Tax Law, Durham University; Programme Director, Oxford University Centre for Business 
Taxation.  A longer version of this paper was presented at conferences on Le renoncement au régime définitif: 
la réorientation européenne de la TVA, held at the University of Toulouse 1, and on ERA Annual Conference on 
European VAT Law, held at the Academy of European Law –ERA, Trier. I am grateful to my hosts at both 
events, and for comments received therein, as well as for those received from many non-academic tax 
colleagues. 
1 A longer version of this section has been published in R. de la Feria, “EU VAT Rate Structure: Towards 
Unilateral Convergence?” in F. Querol (ed.), La réorientation européenne de la TVA (LGDJ, Presses de 
l'Université de Toulouse 1 Capitole, 2014). 
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The introduction of the European VAT system dates back to 1967, with the approval of the First and 
Second VAT Directives.2  The system put in place under those Directives, however, established only a 
basic framework, leaving a full autonomy to Member States insofar as rates were concerned: 
national legislators were free to establish their own rates structure, including number and level of 
rates.3  Primarily for political and practical reasons, Member States used that freedom therefore to 
largely mimic the rates structures applied under their previous turnover taxes.4  With the approval of 
the Sixth VAT Directive in 1977 there was a significant increase on the level of detail contained as 
regards the tax base, and a decrease in the level of freedom granted to Member States.5  Yet, 
despite the progress achieved in some areas of the system, as regards other areas such as the rates 
structure, the EC Council of Ministers reportedly found it impossible to reach agreement and 
consequently further harmonisation was postponed to a later date.  The rules applicable to rates 
under the original version of the Sixth VAT Directive were therefore similar to those previously 
applicable under the Second VAT Directive, i.e. there was total lack of specific rules as regards rates 
structures.  For that outcome certainly contributed the opposition adopted by Member States at 
negotiations - such as France, Germany, and the United Kingdom - keen to maintain the domestic 
application of reduced VAT rates to specific products. 
1.1. Towards an harmonised EU rates structure 
In June 1985, the European Commission presented the so-called White Paper for the completion of 
the Internal Market, which laid down a series of measures with a view to establishing an internal 
market by 1992.  Under the heading removal of fiscal barriers, the paper contained several measures 
in the field of VAT.6  According to the White Paper a close level of “approximation” within VAT was 
required in order to establish a true internal market, and in particular progress had to be achieved as 
regards tax rates.  In this context, the European Commission was to present a proposal, which would 
deal both with the number of rates and level of these rates, in particular that of the standard rate.  
In the meantime, according to the White Paper “provisions should be adopted which will exclude the 
                                                            
2 First Council Directive 67/227/EEC of 11 April 1967, OJ 71, 14/04/1967, 1301 (hereafter “First VAT Directive”); 
and Second Council Directive 67/228/EEC of 11 April 1967, OJ P 71, 14/04/1967, 1303 (hereafter “Second VAT 
Directive”). 
3 Article 9 of the Second VAT Directive. 
4 See R. de la Feria and R. Krever, “Ending VAT Exemptions: Towards A Post-Modern VAT” in R. de la Feria (ed.), 
VAT Exemptions: Consequences and Design Alternatives (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2013), 3-36. 
See also S. Cnossen, “What Rate Structure for a Value-Added Tax?” (1982) National Tax Journal 35(2), 205-214, 
at 209; V. Lenoir, “April 1954–April 2004 – VAT Exemptions: The Original Misunderstanding” (2004) European 
Taxation 10, 456−459, at 456−457. 
5 Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 12 May 1977, OJ L 145, 13/06/1977, 1 (hereafter “Sixth VAT Directive”). 
6 Completing the Internal Market – White Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM(85) 310, 
14 June 1985.  For a detailed analysis of the VAT measures in the White Paper see R. de la Feria, The EU VAT 
System and the Internal Market (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2009), at 57 et seq. 
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proliferation of VAT rates in Member States, or the widening of the gap between VAT rates, since 
this would make subsequent adjustment more difficult”.7 
In 1987 the Commission put forward a proposal for a new VAT rates structure, which would be 
compatible with these objectives.8  This new structure was based on three basic principles, as 
follows: dual-rate system; goods and services compulsorily allocated to each rate; and repeal of 
temporary derogations, allowing Member States to apply reduced rates and zero rates.9  The 1987 
proposals were widely regarded as very ambitious in both their aims and their prospected methods 
for achieving these aims.10  Progress in Council discussions proved slow, and by June 1989 the 
Commission recognised that certain aspects of the 1987 VAT rates proposal were curtailing the 
possibility of reaching agreement.11  It recognised then, that a more pragmatic approach would be 
required.  The idea of a transitional phase, which would last beyond 1 January 1993, started to take 
shape in late 1989.  During the period until 1991 a series of key meetings of the ECOFIN Council of 
Ministers took place, from which emerged the basic shape of was to become known as the 
“transitional VAT system”. 
The decision to introduce a VAT transitional system had serious implications for the discussions on 
the harmonisation of VAT rates.  Rates approximation was still seen as an absolute necessity if 
abolition of border controls was to take place, however, a close approximation such as the one put 
forward by the Commission in its 1987 proposal was no longer required.  In this context, and with a 
view to facilitate agreement within the Council, the Commission suggested in its Communication the 
following alternative rates structure: minimum standard rate; one reduced rate set between 4% and 
9%; and maintenance of zero-rating for a limited number of products.  This alternative rate structure 
was significantly more moderate and less ambitious than the structure originally proposed by the 
Commission.  However, it was still over-ambitious for Member States, particularly as regards the 
reduced rates regime.  In March and June 1991 the Council finally reached agreement on the 
essential characteristics of the VAT rate structure, which was to apply within the context of the new 
                                                            
7 White Paper, n. 6 above, at 52. 
8 Proposal for a Council Directive completing the common system of value added tax and amending Directive 
77/388/EEC – Approximation of VAT rates, COM(87) 321 final/2, 21 August 1987. 
9 See Completion of the Internal Market: approximation of indirect tax structures and harmonisation of indirect 
tax structure, Global Communication from the Commission, COM(87) 320 final, 5 August 1987. 
10 A.J. Easson expressed a widely felt scepticism when he commented: “to expect to achieve an alignment of 
tax rates by 1992, by the end of the century or even by the middle of the next one, is to be completely 
unrealistic.  The approach which has been exposed by the Commission for the past twenty-five years or so is 
doomed to fail”, in “The Elimination of Fiscal Frontiers”, in R. Bieber et al (eds.), 1992: One European Market? 
A Critical Analysis of the Commission’s Internal Market Strategy (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellshaft, 
1988), 241-260, at 260. 
11 Completion of the Internal Market and Approximation of Indirect Taxes, Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and to the European Parliament, COM(89) 260 final, 14 June 1989, at 1. 
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transitional system.  The agreement, which eventually led to the approval of the Council Directive 
92/77/EEC of 19 October 1992, known as the Approximation of VAT Rates Directive,12 not only 
differed significantly from the Commission’s original 1987 proposal, but also differed from the 
alternative rates structure proposed by the Commission in its 1989 Communication. 
The new VAT rate structure, which would apply from 31 December 1992 onwards, was largely a 
product of political compromises and a good example of the victory of politics over economic 
efficiency.  The price for reaching agreement was an extremely complex system (mostly if compared 
with the simplicity of the structure initially proposed by the Commission), filled with exceptions and 
derogations.  Overall, the new rate structure comprised two types of rules: general rules; and 
temporary measures, which in theory would apply only during the transitional system. 
Under the general rules, Member States must apply a standard rate, which should not be lower than 
15%, but no maximum limit was established.  Member States could also apply either one or two 
reduced rates, which could not be lower than 5%.  These rates could be applied to a range of 
seventeen goods and services listed in what is now Annex III and additionally, under certain 
conditions, to the supplies of natural gas and electricity.  During the transitional period, and until the 
introduction of a definitive VAT system, Member States were allowed to maintain and/or introduce 
measures which derogated from the general rates’ rules. Under these measures, Member States 
were allowed, subject to certain conditions, to: continue to apply reduced rates lower than the 5% 
minimum; continue to apply zero-rates; continue to apply both reduced rates lower than the 5% 
minimum and zero-rates to items not listed in Annex III; continue to apply a reduced rate to 
restaurant services, children's clothing, children's footwear and housing; and introduce, dependent 
on certain requirements, an extra reduced rate, not lower than 12%. 
Table 1 provides a comparative overview of the three VAT rate structures discussed above. 
TABLE 1 
VAT RATE STRUCTURES: COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW 
COMMISSION’S 1987 
PROPOSAL 
COMMISSION’S 1989 
ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL 
APPROXIMATION OF VAT 
RATES DIRECTIVE 
 
Two rates system 
(standard rate and 
reduced rate) 
 
Two rates system (standard rate 
and reduced rate) 
 
Five rates system (standard 
rate, three reduced rates 
and zero-rate) 
                                                            
12 Council Directive 92/77/EEC of 19 October 1992, OJ L 316, 31/10/1992, 1 (hereafter the “Approximation of 
VAT Rates Directive”). 
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Standard rate band (14% 
to 20%) 
Standard rate minimum Standard rate minimum 
(15%) 
Reduced rate band (4% to 
9%) 
Reduced rate band (4% to 9%) Reduced rates minimum 
(5%) in theory; in practice no 
minimum applies 
6 items which may be 
subject to reduced rate 
6 items which may be subject to 
reduced rate 
22 items which may be 
subject to reduced rates 
Compulsory nature of list 
of goods / services 
subject to reduced rate 
Compulsory nature of list of 
goods / services subject to 
reduced rate 
Optional nature of list of 
goods / services subject to 
reduced rate 
Abolition of zero-rating Maintenance of zero-rating for a 
limited range of products 
Maintenance of zero-rating 
 
1.2. Post-1992 failed initiatives 
The VAT transitional system, including the temporary measures on VAT rates described above, was 
supposed to be in place for a period of four years after 1 January 1993.  A time plan was therefore 
agreed upon according to which the European Commission would bring proposals forward by the 
end of 1994, with a view to implementing a definitive VAT system based on the origin principle by 
1997.  Unfortunately, the Commission was unable to fulfil this time plan and it was not until the 
summer of 1996 that a work programme was presented for the adoption of the definitive VAT 
system.13  Although formal legislative proposals were never put forward, the programme contained 
an outline of the envisaged system, as well as a detailed work plan extending through to mid-1999.14  
Amongst the key features of the definitive VAT system, as foreseen under that programme, was the 
further harmonisation of the main aspects of the VAT system including rates. 
This new attempt was too doomed to fail. The first setback came very soon after the presentation of 
the 1996 programme, as Member States failed to reach total agreement on the already tabled 
proposal regarding the establishment of a fixed band for standard rates of VAT.  This included a 
minimum rate of 15% and a maximum rate of 25% and whilst Member States were able to agree on 
the minimum level, it was impossible to reach unanimity on a maximum level.  Ultimately, the 
proposal was approved but the final text contained no reference to the maximum level of standard 
rate.15  Thus, very little progress was made on the Commission’s proposed 1996 programme and it 
                                                            
13 See A common system of VAT – A programme for the Single Market, COM(96) 328 final, 22 July 1996. 
14 This means that in practice even if the proposals presented during this period would have been agreed upon 
by Member States, the definitive VAT system would not be in place until 2001 at the earliest, see ibid, at 34. 
15 Council Directive 96/95/EC of 20 December 1996, OJ L 338, 28/12/1996, 89. 
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soon became clear that the degree of harmonisation necessary for the introduction of a definitive 
VAT system (particularly in terms of VAT rates) would not be achieved. 
1.3. Further differentiation of rates structures 
Since the approval of the Approximation of VAT Rates Directive, VAT rates, far from converging as 
might have been expected,16 can diverge much more than under the legal framework set up in 1992.  
As reported by the European Commission in 2001, despite its tentative efforts to increase 
convergence, “when current rates are compared with those applicable in 1997, it is apparent that 
rates continue to vary considerably”.17 
The main reason for increased rate differentiation within Europe since 1992 has been the so-called 
labour-intensive services experiment.  Implemented in 1999, the experiment allowed the application 
of reduced rates to certain labour-intensive services, such as hairdressing and window cleaning, with 
the aim of testing its impact on job creation and the combat against the “black market”.18  Initially 
intended to last for three years, the experiment was consecutively extended despite disappointing 
results.19  A report from the European Commission, published in 2003, confirmed that the impact of 
introducing reduced rates on prices of labour-intensive services was minimal.  When conducting 
price surveys, Member States found that reduced rates were only partially reflected in consumer 
prices or not at all and that at least part of the VAT reduction was used to increase the margins of 
service providers.  Moreover, even where the VAT reduction had been passed on to the consumers, 
Member States found that this was only a temporary measure and prices would subsequently 
increase.20 Overall, the study concluded that, partially due to the lack of effect on prices, the aims of 
the experiment, namely to increase employment and to combat the black economy, had not be 
achieved.21 
                                                            
16 This was in fact the Parliament’s opinion, see Options for a definitive VAT system, Working Paper, Economic 
Affairs Series, E 5, October 1995, at 87.  This was also the view expressed by several authors and Member 
States’ officials, as reported in P. Guieu and C. Bonnet, “Completion of the Internal Market and Indirect 
Taxation” (1987) Journal of Common Market Studies XXV(3), 209-222, at 215. 
17 See Report from the Commission on reduced VAT rates drawn up in accordance with Article 12(4) of the Sixth 
Council Directive of 17 May 1977 on the harmonisation of the laws of the Member States relating to turnover 
taxes – Common system of value added tax: uniform basis of assessment, COM(2001) 599 final, 22 October 
2001, at paragraph 19. 
18 Council Directive 1999/85/EC of 22 October 1999, OJ L277, 28/10/1999, 34. 
19 Council Directive 2002/92/EC of 2 December 2002, OJ L 331, 07/12/2002, p. 27; Council Directive 
2006/18/EC of 14 February 2007, OJ L345, 28/12/2005, 19-20; Council Directive 2004/15/EC of 10 February 
2004, OJ L52, 21/02/2004, 61. 
20 See Experimental application of a reduced rate of VAT to certain labour-intensive services, Report from the 
Commission to the Council and to the European Parliament, COM(2003) 309 final, 2 June 2003; and Evaluation 
report on the experimental application of a reduced rate of VAT to certain labour-intensive services, 
Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2003) 622, 2 June 2003. 
21 Ibid, at 28. 
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Yet, the above results did not prevent Member States from either further extending the experiment, 
but moreover, from transforming the temporary experiment into permanent measures.  In 2008 the 
European Commission put forward a new legislative proposal, which it designated as “a first action 
concerning reduced VAT rates” and as a “limited legislative proposal […] relating to urgent issues, 
which do not require any substantial additional study”.22  The proposal had two objectives, both 
allowing for further differentiation of VAT rates: to make the possibility of applying reduced rates to 
certain labour-intensive services permanent, and to allow Member States the freedom to apply 
reduced rates to “locally supplies services”, such as restaurant services.  The proposal was approved 
not long after its presentation, with the final legislative document essentially following its wording – 
both factors a clear indication that negotiations had been relatively straightforward, and that 
Member States were broadly in agreement with the new direction taken by the European 
Commission.23 
In the meantime, Commission’s attempts at limiting overall differentiation failed miserably.  In 2003 
the Commission presented a proposal with a view to “review and rationalise the use of reduced 
rates”.  The proposal left considerably more freedom to Member States to decide on their own VAT 
rates structure than under previous Commission’s proposals, namely the 1987 and 1989 proposals.  
Obviously, it considered that by allowing increased freedom, the likelihood of Member States 
reaching unanimous agreement at the Council would also increase.  Although not exceedingly 
ambitious, however, the proposal did envisage the move to a compulsory natured list of products 
which may be subject to reduced rates, which seems to have been sufficient to cause concern 
amongst Member States.24  After years of discussions at the Council,25 the proposal was finally 
approved in 2006 but at significant costs: the emphasis was no longer on rationalisation of reduced 
rates, but rather on the extension of the temporary rates provisions within the VA Directive, as well 
as on the extension of the list of products to which reduced rates may apply. 
                                                            
22 Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2006/112/EC as regards rates of value added tax, 
COM(2008) 428 final, 7 July 2008, at 2. This is the sixth formal proposal by the Commission exclusively on VAT 
rates (excluding informal suggestions). 
23 Council Directive 2009/47/EC of 5 May 2009, OJ L116, 09/05/2009, 18-20. 
24 Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 77/388/EEC as regards reduced rates of value added tax, 
COM(2003) 397 final, 23 July 2003. 
25 See Preparation of Eurogroup and Council of Economics and Finance Ministers, Luxembourg, 6-7 October 
2003, MEMO/03/191, 06/10/2003), and 2530th Council Meeting – Economic and Financial Affairs – 
Luxembourg, 7 October 2003, C/03/274, Pres/03/274, 07/10/2003 and Results of the Council of Economics and 
Finance Ministers, 25th November 2003 – financial services and taxation, MEMO/03/241, 26/11/2003). During 
2005 a substantial push was given to this proposal by both Luxembourg and the United Kingdom – which held 
the Presidency of the Council during the first and second half of 2005, respectively, see Results of Council of 
Economic and Finance Ministers, Brussels, 6-7 December 2004, MEMO/04/289, 08/12/2004, and Results of the 
2688th ECOFIN Meeting, Press Release 13678/05, Brussels, 8 November 2005, 21. 
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The 2006 legislation also included a mandate from the Council to the Commission to present to the 
European Parliament and to the Council, by the end of June 2007, an overall assessment report on 
the impact of reduced rates on job creation, economic growth and the internal market.26  This 
mandate has produced quick results. In 2007 the Commission published a study undertaken by 
Copenhagen Economics on the economic impact of the application of reduced rates;27 and in March 
2008 it launched a public consultation as part of its aim of “launching a broad debate in the Council, 
the European Parliament and with other stakeholders to obtain all relevant views before initiating a 
more far reaching proposal on reduced rates is the most effective approach to develop a sustainable 
and well balanced proposal in the medium term”.28  For those awaiting the presentation of this “far 
reaching proposal”, early signs were not encouraging.  As discussed above the European Commission 
seemed to be moving in the wrong direction: not only had the most recent proposal on VAT rates 
been aimed at increasing differentiation of rates, rather than the opposite, but equally the 
consultation paper expressly stated that the Commission was considering introduction of further 
reduced rates to, amongst others, environmentally friendly products.  As will be seen below, this 
approach changed radically in the wake of the economic and financial crisis. 
1.4. State-of-Play in 2008 
As discussed above, it is clear that although the provisions governing the rates structure have been 
subject to several amendments since the entering into force of the Approximation of VAT Rates 
Directive,29 “the situation has changed little and the level of harmonisation of VAT rates has 
remained modest”.30  At present the rates structure under the VAT Directive is a multiple-rate 
                                                            
26 Council Directive 2006/18/EC of 14 February 2006, OJ L51, 22/02/2006, 12. 
27 Study on reduced VAT applied to goods and services in the Member States of the European Union, Taxation 
Papers, Working Paper No. 13, 2008.  A summary of the results of the study was then published in 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on VAT rates other than 
standard VAT rates, COM(2007) 380 final, 5 July 2007. 
28 Consultation Paper: Review of existing legislation on VAT reduced rates, TAXUD/D1D/24232, 6 March 2008, 
at 2. 
29 In addition to the legislation already mentioned, the following has also included some amendments to VAT 
rates provisions: Council Directive 92/111/EEC of 14 December 1992, OJ L 384, 30/12/1992, 47; Council 
Directive 94/5/EC of 14 February 1994, OJ L 60, 03/03/1994, 16; Council Directive 95/7/EC of 10 April 1995, OJ 
L 102, 05/05/1995, 18; Council Directive 96/42/EC of 25 June 1996, OJ L170, 09/07/1996, 34; Council Directive 
98/80/EC of 12 October 1998, OJ L 281, 17/01/1998, 31; Council Directive 1999/49/EC of 25 May 1999, OJ L 
139, 02/06/1999, 27; Council Directive 2000/17/EC of 30 March 2000, OJ L84, 05/04/2000, 24; Council 
Directive 2001/4/EC of 19 January 2001, OJ L 22, 24/01/2001, 17; Council Directive 2002/38/EC of 7 May 2002, 
OJ L 128, 15/05/2002, 41; Council Directive 2005/92/EC of 12 December 2005, OJ L51, 22/02/2006, 12-13; 
Council Directive 2007/75/EC of 20 December 2007, OJ L346, 29/12/2007, 13-14; and finally, with effect from 
1 January 2010, Council Directive 2008/8/EC of 12 February 2008, OJ L44, 20/02/2008, 11-22. 
30 See n. 13 above, at 5. 
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system, allowing for a standard rate and one or two reduced rates in theory (two more in practice), 
and subject to a few basic rules, as follows:31 
(1) The standard rate cannot be lower than 15% (Article 97 of the VAT Directive);32 
(2) Member States may apply one or two reduced rates to supplies of goods/services specified in 
Annex III, including labour-intensive services, but not where they are electronically supplied 
(Article 98 of the VAT Directive); 
(3) Subject to certain conditions, reduced rates may also be applied to supplies of natural gas and 
electricity (Article 102 of the Common VAT System Directive), imports of works of art, collectors’ 
items and antiques and certain supplies of works of art (Article 103 of the VAT Directive); 
(4) During the transition period, i.e., until the entry into force of the definitive VAT system, Member 
States may maintain, under certain conditions, various special measures concerning the 
application of reduced rates, including: application of reduced rates lower than the authorised 
5% minimum; maintenance of reduced rates for goods or services not covered by Annex III; or 
application of an additional reduced rate, known as the “parking rate”, no lower than 12% 
(Articles 109 to 122 of the VAT Directive); and, 
(5) Finally, some Member States have been allowed to temporarily apply reduced rates to specific 
transactions (Articles 123 to 130 of the VAT Directive), and special rules also apply to specific EU 
regions (Articles 104 and 105 of the VAT Directive). 
The described rules leave Member States significant freedom to establish their own rates structure.  
In practice Member States are free to decide on the following: whether to apply one or two reduced 
rates; whether to apply, subject to special conditions, an extra “parking rate”; the level of standard 
rate, as long as it is more than 15%; the level of the reduced rate(s), subject to certain conditions, 
which depend on each Member State’s specific circumstances; and to which goods / services to 
apply reduced rates too, subject to the conditions set out in the VAT Directive.33  Unsurprisingly, this 
freedom resulted until recently in VAT rates structures within the EU remaining highly discrepant, 
highly differentiated, and highly complex.  The high level of differentiation is particularly worrying, 
                                                            
31 Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax, OJ L347, 
11/12/2006, 1–118 (hereafter “VAT Directive”). 
32 The date until which this minimum standard rate level will apply has been consecutively postponed.  This 
date currently stands at 31 December 2015, see Council Directive 2010/88/EU of 7 December 2010, OJ L326, 
10/12/2010, p. 1-2. 
33 The Commission has been publishing on an annual basis, a document listing the VAT rates applied to a range 
of products across the EU, VAT Rates Applied in the Member States of the European Community.  For an 
overview of the rates applicable before the economic and financial crisis see the document dated January 
2008. See also A. Mathis, VAT indicators, Taxation Papers, Working Paper No. 2, April 2004. 
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since in itself will almost always result in high level of discrepancy across Member States, and 
unavoidably in high level of complexity. 
Unfortunately, and until 2008, the rate differentiation in EU Member States was particularly 
extensive.  As regards the “old” Member States, six (Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy and 
Luxembourg) applied a reduced rate lower than the minimum laid down in Article 98 of the VAT 
Directive (a “super-reduced rate”); three (Belgium, Ireland and Luxembourg) applied a reduced rate 
not lower than 12% (the “parking rate”); five Member States (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Italy and 
Sweden) applied a zero rate on a marginal and restricted basis; while Ireland and the United 
Kingdom continued to make extensive use of this derogation.34  The situation was slightly different 
within the new Member States, but not radically so: six (Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, 
Malta and Slovakia) applied a zero rate of VAT, and almost all were granted authorisations to 
introduce / maintain the application of rates which derogated from Articles 98 and 99 of the VAT 
Directive.35  Member States’ application of the labour-intensive services experiment was also a good 
example of the discrepancies that can emerge in the context of the application of reduced rates.  In 
2009 only eighteen, out of then twenty-seven Member States, submitted applications to avail of the 
option to apply reduced rates to labour-intensive services. Of those eighteen Member States, each 
of them had chosen different services from the ones listed in the old Annex IV (now part of Annex 
III): twelve had chosen renovation and repairing of private dwellings; eight, small services of 
repairing; six, domestic care services; seven, hairdressing; three window cleaning and household 
cleaning services; and one minor services of repairing clothing and household linen.36  With the 
transformation of the labour-intensive services experiment into a permanent feature of the EU rates 
structure, as discussed above, this level of differentiation looked more likely to increase, rather than 
to decrease.  Instead the financial and economic crisis hit, and Member States approach to rate 
differentiation changed radically. 
2. EU VAT Rates: Post-2008 
According to the OECD, after a period of relative stability between 1996 and 2008, the average 
standard rate of VAT started to rise again after 2008,37 and it now stands at around 21.5%.38 Indeed 
                                                            
34 The data was reported on the Commission’s report on reduced VAT rates, COM(2001) 599 final, 22 October 
2001, n. 17 above.  An analysis of the rates in force on 1 January 2009 shows that the situation had not 
improved and, if anything, it had worsened by then. 
35 Articles 123 to 130 of the VAT Directive. 
36 See Council Decision 2006/774/EC of 7 November 2006, OJ L314, 15/11/2006, 28-32; and Council Decision 
2007/50/EC of 30 January 2007, OJ L222, 31/1/2007, 14-15. 
37 See OECD, Consumption Tax Trends 2012 – VAT/GST and Excise Rates, Trends and Administration Issues 
(Paris: OECD Publishing, 2012), at 15. 
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between 1 January 2008 and 1 January 2014 many OECD countries increased their standard and / or 
their reduced VAT rate, including –albeit not exclusively – EU countries, as highlighted in Table 2 
below.  At the same time, as the table also demonstrates, several EU Member States have also made 
substantial amendments to their tax base, moving goods and services from reduced to intermediate 
rate, or from reduced and intermediate to standard rates.  Overall a staggering twenty-three, out of 
the twenty-eight EU countries, changed their VAT rate structures during this period.  Out of the few 
Member States not to change their rates, one, Germany, had also done so just one year beforehand, 
increasing their standard rate by 3%.  This is, of course, not to say that there were no changes in the 
opposite direction, namely lowering of rate levels, or narrowing of the base, but as Table 3 
demonstrates, these were comparatively rare and circumspect. 
Table 2 
CHANGES IN VAT RATES IN THE PERIOD 2008-2014 
INCREASE OF RATE LEVELS / TAX BASE 
 Increase in Standard 
Rate 
Increase in Reduced 
Rates 
Base Broadening 
Measures 
Bulgaria39 - 7% to 9%  
Croatia40 23% to 25% 10% to 13% Yes 
Cyprus41 15%to 19% -  
Czech Republic42 19% to 21% 9% to 15%  
Estonia43 18% to 20% 5% to 9%  
Finland44 22% to 24% 8% to 10%  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
38 In the end of 2012 it stood at 21.6%, but it is likely to have increased since then, see VATlive, Global VAT 
rates on the increase – review the major changes, November 23, 2012.  See also R. Asquith, “On the rise” 
(2012) Taxation 169 (4341), 15. 
39 European Commission, VAT Rates Applied in the Member States of the European Union – Situation at 1st July 
2014, taxud.c.1(2014)2276174 - EN, 25/06/2014. 
40 VATlive, Croatia raises VAT rate on restaurants and other services, September 27, 2013; and VATlive, Further 
changes to Croatia VAT rules and rates, December 4, 2013 
41 VATlive, Cyprus raises VAT to 19% by 2014, December 11, 2012. 
42 European Commission, n. 39 above. See also VATlive, Czech VAT rate to increase 1% to 21% in 2013, April 2, 
2012; and VATlive, Czech 1% VAT rise for 2013, December 5, 2012. 
43 European Commission, n. 39 above. 
44 European Commission, n. 39 above.  See also VATlive, Finland raises VAT from 23% to 24% in 2013, March 
24, 2012. 
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France45 19.6% to 20% 7% to 10%  
Greece46 19% to 23% 4.5% to 6.5% 
9% to 13% 
 
Hungary47 20% to 27% 15% to 18% Yes 
Ireland48 21% to 23% - Yes 
Italy49 20% to 22% - Yes 
Latvia50 18% to 21% 5% to 12%  
Lithuania51 18% to 21% - Yes 
Luxembourg52 15% to 17% - Yes 
Malta53 - - Yes 
Netherlands54 19% to 21%   
Poland55 22% to 23% 3% to 7% 
5% to 8% 
 
Portugal56 20% to 23% 5% to 6% 
12% to 13% 
Yes 
                                                            
45 VATlive, Implementation of French VAT Rise to 20% from 1 Jan 2014, December 16, 2013; VATlive, France 
confirms 2014 VAT rise to 20%, November 22, 2013; VATlive, French VAT rate rises from 19.6% to 20% in 2014, 
November 8, 2012; and VATlive, France to raise VAT rate on art from 7% to 10% Jan 2014, August 29, 2013. 
46 European Commission, n. 39 above. 
47 European Commission, n. 39 above. See also VATlive, Hungary raises VAT to 27% in 2012, September 18, 
2012; and VATlive, Hungarian VAT goes ahead without foodstuffs VAT cut, November 8, 2013. 
48 VATlive, Irish Finance Bill 2013 includes VAT measures, November 4, 2013; and VATlive, Ireland raises VAT 
2% to 23% from 1 January 2012, December 7, 2011. 
49 VATlive, Italy to raise VAT 1% from 21% to 22% September 2011, September 8, 2011; VATlive, Italy VAT rise 
to 22% proceeds 1st Oct 2013 as government teeters, September 29, 2013; VATlive, Italy increases VAT from 
21% to 22% 1 July 2013, October 12, 2013; and VATlive, Italian VAT rise has no effect on inflation figures, 
December 5, 2013. 
50 European Commission, n. 39 above. 
51 VATlive, Lithuania new VAT rates and compliance simplifications, February 5, 2013. 
52 VATlive, Luxembourg VAT increase confirmation, May 8, 2013; and VATlive, EU member states must broaden 
VAT base, October 13, 2013; VATlive, Luxembourg VAT rise to 17% in 2015, February 3, 2014. 
53 European Commission, n. 39 above. 
54 European Commission, n. 39 above. See also VATlive, Netherlands raises VAT from 19% to 21% October 
2012, May 1, 2012. 
55 European Commission, n. 39 above. See also VATlive, Poland increases VAT 1% to 23% January 2013, July 7, 
2010; and VATlive, Poland confirms 23% VAT rate till at least 2016,September 4, 2013. 
56 European Commission, n. 39 above. See also VATlive, Portugal raises VAT 1% to 21%, May 15, 2010; and 
VATlive, Portugal raises VAT 2% to 23% from January 2011, October 1, 2010. 
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Romania57 19% to 24% - Yes 
Slovakia58 19% to 20% -  
Slovenia59 20% to 22% 8.5% to 9.5%  
Spain60 16% to 21% 7% to 10% Yes 
UK61 17,5% to 20% -  
 
Table 3 
CHANGES IN VAT RATES IN THE PERIOD 2009-2014 
(POTENTIAL) DECREASES IN RATE LEVELS / TAX BASE 
 Decrease in 
Standard Rate 
Decrease in 
Reduced Rate 
Increase in Levels of 
Differentiation 
Base Narrowing 
Measures 
Czech Republic62 - - Yes - 
Finland63 - 17% to 14% - - 
Greece64 - - - Yes 
Hungary65 - - Yes - 
Ireland66 - - - Yes 
Romania67 - - Yes - 
 
These numbers demonstrate the extent to which Member States turned to VAT policy in the wake of 
the economic and financial crisis.  The reason is clear: confronted with high budget deficits and 
limited (or negative) economic growth, whilst at the same time deprived of the possibility of 
                                                            
57 European Commission, n. 39 above.  See also VATlive, Romania cuts VAT rate on bread, August 10, 2013. 
58 VATlive, Slovakia raises VAT 1% to 20% in January 2011, October 8, 2010. 
59 VATlive, Slovenia 2% VAT rate increase July 2013, March 29, 2013 
60 European Commission, n. 39 above. See also VATlive, Spain raises VAT from 18% to 21% 1 September 2012, 
July 4, 2012; and VATlive, EU member states must broaden VAT base, October 13, 2013. 
61 VATlive, UK raises VAT 2.5% to 20% in 2011, June 22, 2010. 
62 VATlive, Czech Republic considers new reduced VAT rate, December 19, 2013. 
63 European Commission, n. 39 above. 
64 VATlive, Greece wins reduction to restaurant VAT from 23% to 13%, July 11, 2013. 
65 VATlive, Hungary to debate 35% luxury rate this week, October 17, 2013. 
66 VATlive, Ireland reduces VAT on tourism until 2013, June 2, 2012; and VATlive, Ireland extends 9% VAT 
subsidy on tourism and newspapers, October 16, 2013. 
67 European Commission, n. 39 above. 
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currency devaluation and bound to a common interest rate, Member States—specifically those 
which are part of the Eurozone—were confronted with serious limitations on their abilities to 
respond effectively; it was therefore unsurprising that most turned to tax policy as their preferred 
means of macro-economic intervention.68  Within tax policy the weapon of choice seems to have 
been VAT. 
This focus at national level on VAT policy in the current economic climate is hardly surprising.  
Certainly it comes within the context of the general trend for a long-term shift towards indirect 
taxation, rather than direct taxation. This trend is based largely on the traditional economic view 
that consumption taxes are relatively more efficient as a revenue source, are less distortive, and 
have favourable effects on growth and employment. Thus, in many Member States, VAT has become 
the main source of national revenue: in 2009 it accounted for 21% of the tax revenues of EU 
Member States, an increase of 12% since 1995.  Against the background of the economic crisis, 
however, these comparative advantages of VAT have become particularly significant: on one hand, 
national governments need additional revenue, and VAT presents itself as a more reliable and stable 
source of revenue than profits and income, especially during an economic downturn; on the other 
hand, the emphasis is also on economic growth as the only medium to long-term solution, with less 
distortive taxes becoming particularly appealing. 
Having opted for VAT policy as an instrument to deal with the effects of the economic and financial 
crisis, Member States had the further choice of whether to raise rates or broaden the tax base in 
order to raise further revenue.  As Table 2 demonstrates almost all Member States opted for 
increase in rates, with some of these also adopting base broad measures; only one Member State 
adopted base broadening measures whilst not increasing rates. 
Clearly keen to harness the political momentum, the European Commission presented in December 
2010 the Green Paper on the Future of VAT.69  The stated aim of the paper, which was said to be 
“one of the most important documents issued by the European Commission for some time”,70 was 
to launch a broad based consultation process on the functioning of the current EU VAT system.  
                                                            
68 As A. J. Easson prophetically pointed out in 1993, “the fiscal implications of EMU are obvious and 
considerable. Of the three main instruments of economic policy, Member States will soon relinquish all control 
over exchange rate policy and will gradually, over the next five years or so, lose much of their control over 
monetary policy. They will thus be left with fiscal policy alone”, see Taxation in the European Community, 
European Community Law Series (London & Atlantic Highlands, NJ: The Athlone Press, 1993), at 18-19. 
69 European Commission, Green Paper on the Future of VAT—Towards a simpler, more robust and efficient VAT 
system, COM(2010) 695 final, December 1, 2010. See also, Accompanying document to the Green Paper on the 
Future of VAT—Towards a simpler, more robust and efficient VAT system, Commission Staff Working 
Document, SEC(2010) 1455 final, December 1, 2010. 
70 R. Maas et al., “VAT Focus—Roundtable discussion: The Green Paper & the Future of VAT” (2011) Tax 
Journal 1094, 12. 
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Indeed, whilst the paper itself was hardly as ambitious as that aim might suggest, it was nevertheless 
far-reaching, covering many—albeit not all—of the most problematic areas of the system, including 
harmonisation of rates. A year later, amidst favourable reactions from other European institutions 
and various stakeholders,71 the Commission issued a follow-up Communication, which had two 
stated purposes: in the long term, to set out the fundamental features of a future EU VAT system—a 
system which continues to raise revenue but which also increases competitiveness; and in the short 
to medium term, to list the priority areas for further action in the coming years—with a view to 
moving towards those objectives.72  Amongst these listed priority areas was the review of the rate 
structure. 
In the Communication the Commission states that in order to increase the efficiency of the VAT 
system, it favours restricted use of reduced VAT rates. The use of reduced rates should then be 
based upon a few guiding principles: 
(1) Abolition of those reduced rates which constitute an obstacle to the proper functioning of the 
internal market; 
(2) Abolition of reduced rates on goods and services for which the consumption is discouraged by 
other EU policies; 
(3) Similar goods and services should be subject to the same VAT rate. 
The Commission set out the aim of launching in 2012 an assessment of the current VAT rates 
structure in the light of these guiding principles, and subsequently make proposals along those lines 
after ample consultation with stakeholders and Member States by the end of 2013.73  In this context 
it launched a public consultation in October 2012 on the review of the EU legislation on VAT reduced 
rates.74  As opposed to previous initiatives which were broad in their scope, this was a very targeted 
public consultation: only nine questions, strictly framed by the guiding principles, eight of which 
concerned specific sectors of activity, namely the application of reduced rates of VAT to water, 
                                                            
71 See European Commission, Summary Report of the Outcome of the Public Consultation on the Green Paper 
on the Future of VAT—Towards a simpler, more robust and efficient VAT system (December 1, 2010-May 31, 
2011), taxud.c.1(2011)1417007, December 2, 2011; European Parliament, Report on the Future of VAT 
(2011/2082(INI)), Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, A7-0318/2011, September 30, 2011; 
European Economic and Social Committee, Opinion on “Green Paper on the Future of VAT—Towards a 
simpler, more robust and efficient VAT system”, July 14, 2011, [2011] OJ C318/87; and European Commission, 
Future VAT System: pro-business, pro-growth, Press Release IP/11/1508, December 6, 2011. 
72 Future of VAT—Towards a simpler, more robust and efficient VAT system tailored to the single market, 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic 
and Social Committee, COM(2011) 851 final, December 6, 2011. 
73 Ibid, at 11-12. 
74 European Commission, Review of existing legislation on VAT reduced rates, Consultation Paper, TAXUD/C1, 
October 2012. 
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energy, waste and e-books.  Despite the limited scope of the questions asked, the Commission also 
asked more generally for any “concrete examples of distortions of competition within the internal 
market or of specific problems encountered due to the current VAT rules”.  Despite this effective 
broadening of the scope of the consultation, the targeted nature of the questions resulted in a low 
number of submissions from academics, tax advisors and tax practitioners; and on the contrary, a 
very high number – more than half of all submissions – from national or European associations, the 
large majority of them representing sectors currently benefiting from a reduced VAT rate.75  
Unsurprisingly, the nature of the respondents reflected heavily on the contents of the responses: 
most were opposed to the abolition of the reduced rates and/or advocating for their extension; and 
many challenged the general trend of shifting taxation away from labour towards consumption.  
Some submissions also defended that no further harmonisation should take place, and that the 
decision on whether or not to apply reduced VAT rates should be left to the Member States. 
In the context of the outcome of this public consultation, it is pertinent to question whether this 
latest initiative can be successful. Reviewing the rate structure has been part of every Commission’s 
attempt to reform the EU VAT system—and with good reason. A recent study commissioned by the 
EU Commission indicates that a 50% reduction in the dissimilarity in VAT rates structures between 
Member States could result in a rise of 9.8% in intra-EU trade and an increase in real GDP of 1.1%.76 
Moreover, this is merely the last of several studies indicating the negative consequences of rate 
differentiation and its unproven positive effects.  Yet, these studies in themselves have traditionally 
been insufficient to convince Member States to act. On the contrary, what has now made many 
Member States act at a domestic level has been the pressing need for extra revenue. Whilst no 
reference is made to this reality in the Communication, it is clear that the Commission is relying on 
that need in order to push this measure forward—the fact that so many Member States have 
already taken this political choice at national level might just be enough to create the necessary 
momentum for agreement at EU level. 
This signals a significant shift in approach to VAT harmonisation by the European Commission.  For 
the last four decades the Commission’s approach has been primarily to convince Member States 
that harmonisation is an essential step for the establishment and the functioning of the European 
Internal Market.  Although one can certainly agree with that statement,77 the reality is that this 
approach has failed consistently to create the necessary political enthusiasm for reform. In essence, 
                                                            
75 European Commission, Review of Existing Legislation on VAT Reduced Rates, Summary Report of the 
Outcome of the Public Consultation (8 October 2012-4 January 2013), taxud.c.1. (2013) 708070, 12/04/2013. 
76 See A Retrospective Evaluation of Elements of the EU VAT System — Final Report, TAXUD/2010/DE/328, FWC 
No. TAXUD/2010/CC/104, December 1, 2011. 
77 See R. de la Feria, n. 6 above. 
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it has failed to rally the troops. The approach now adopted by the European Commission is very 
different: there are comparatively few references to the EU perspective, and indeed there is only 
one reference in the entire Green Paper on the Future of VAT to the “Internal Market”; instead the 
focus is clearly on “consolidation of public finances” and “sustainable economic growth”. In the 
midst of the economic and financial crisis, the Commission has clearly re-packaged long-sought 
reform by offering Member States EU answers to national needs—and that is why this time, it might 
just succeed.78  Furthermore it must also be acknowledged that the limited, or specific, nature of the 
review now being considered may make it politically easier to attain Member States’ agreement on.  
This limited nature of the review, however, also raises concerns namely on whether, even if 
successful, is this proposed review worthwhile?  Certainly it would result in an improvement to the 
current EU VAT rate structure, but not a massive one.  Essentially there is a trade of: lower risks, 
lower returns; such are the costs of political realism. 
 
3. Blueprint for Reform of VAT Rates in Europe 
Whether the latest European Commission’s initiative on the review of the EU VAT rate structure 
gathers the necessary support or not, it is clear that only limited improvements to the structure can 
be achieved.  Therefore, if significant gains are to be attained, they must come through a different 
route.  In this context, would it be possible to have significantly improved, even converging, VAT rate 
structures in Europe, through national, uncoordinated, action?  How would such a VAT rate structure 
look like, and how would it be achieved? 
3.1 Ideal VAT rate structure 
The case for differential tax rates under optimum commodity taxation has been consistently made 
since the elaboration in the 1920s of the inverse elasticity rule, which suggests that economic 
efficiency is maximised by taxing consumption goods at rates that are inversely proportional to their 
price elasticity.79  In practice, however, this rule raises various difficulties.  Firstly, the information 
required about consumers’ behaviour needed to operate a differential tax system that improved 
economic welfare would be so extensive as to make such regimes impracticable: it would not only 
require estimates of price-elasticities of every product on the market, but also regular updates of 
                                                            
78 This point is developed further in R. de la Feria, “The 2011 Communication on the Future of VAT: Harnessing 
the economic crisis for EU VAT reform” (2012) British Tax Review 2, 119-133. 
79 F. Ramsey, “A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation” (1927) Economic Journal 37, 47-61.  See also A.B. 
Atkinson and J.E. Stiglitz, “The Structure of Indirect Taxation and Economic Efficiency” (1972) Journal of Public 
Economics 1, 97-119.  For a comprehensive review of the literature on optimal commodity taxation theory see 
I. Crawford, M. Keen and S. Smith, “Value-Added Tax and Excises” in S. Adam et al (eds.), Dimensions of Tax 
Design – the Mirrlees Review (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 275-422. 
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those elasticities to take into account changes in preferences and / or technology.80  The rule also 
raises vertical equity concerns, since it suggests higher tax rates on price-inelastic products, which 
are typically basic goods that make up larger proportion of the expenditures of low-income 
households.81  Finally, application of this rule to take into account cross-price elasticities, would 
suggest higher rates on products for which high-income individuals tend to have a relatively strong 
taste.  However, cross-price elasticities are particularly difficult to estimate, deeming 
implementation of this rule even more complex.82 
In any event, the VAT rates structures currently applied in Europe do not reflect the inverse elasticity 
rule, but quite the opposite with reduced rates applying primarily to low elasticity products, such as 
food. As discussed above, the original introduction of reduced VAT rates was based not so much on 
clearly articulated policy objectives but rather on pragmatic political goals, as designers of the VAT 
sought to replicate the impact of the predecessor turnover taxes and deflect concerns about the tax 
on beneficiaries of previous concessions.  Over time, however, it was argued that the use of reduced 
rates achieves social and distributional aims.  This rationale for applying reduced rates of VAT 
supports the characterisation of the use of these rates as tax expenditure.  Indeed, whilst the exact 
concept is controversial, tax expenditures are generally defined as deviations from a tax norm or a 
benchmark that result in a reduced tax liability for the beneficiaries, who are generally a particular 
group of taxpayers or an economic activity.83  What constitutes the benchmark, insofar as VAT is 
concerned, involves an element of judgment on what constitutes the normal VAT tax base and rate, 
and consequently it may vary across countries and over time.84 However, the use of reduced rates 
for distributional and social reasons does fit the general definition of tax expenditure, and therefore 
is usually characterised as such – as opposed to tax exemptions which are characterised by some EU 
countries as part of their benchmark system.85 
Once it is accepted that the application of reduced rates amounts to tax expenditures, these should 
be subject to a cost-benefit analysis similarly to direct expenditure programs: what are the benefits, 
and what are the costs of applying reduced VAT rates?  Moreover, is increasing VAT rates more 
effective in terms of both revenue and economic growth, and to decrease / eliminate tax 
expenditures? 
                                                            
80 OECD, Choosing a Broad Base – Low Rate Approach to Taxation, OECD Tax Policy Studies, No. 19 (OECD 
Publishing, 2010), at 16. 
81 Ibid. 
82 P.B. Sorensen, “The Theory of Optimal Taxation: What is the Policy Relevance?” (2007) International Tax and 
Public Finance 14, 383-406. 
83 OECD, n.80, at 39. 
84 Ibid, at 39-40. 
85 Ibid, at 50. 
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3.1.1 What are the benefits of applying reduced VAT rates? 
As discussed above, it has been argued that the use of reduced rates achieves social and 
distributional aims, and namely three rationales have been offered, as follows: 
(1) Vertical equity: idea that these concessions limit the natural regressivity of VAT, i.e. that the tax 
weights more heavily on poorer households; so applying reduced rates to key products such as 
food, energy, healthcare, education, etc, would limit the impact of this tax on those households. 
(2) Positive externalities: idea that these concessions increased consumption of so-called merit 
goods, such as cultural events, books, sport activities, etc. 
(3) Increase employment: idea that application of reduced rates will ultimately lead to increase 
employment in labour-intensive industries (e.g. hairdressing), or areas where price is 
particularly elastic (e.g. electronics), or both (e.g. restaurants). 
The equity argument derives from the fact that the proportion of income that is saved reduces as 
income reduces, with the lowest income earners using all their income for consumption and 
diverting none to savings.  As VAT falls only on income used for consumption and exempts income 
that is applied to savings, the tax is said to fall more heavily on lower income persons than on higher 
income persons in terms of the proportion of income derived by those persons.86  Reduced rates for 
commodities that form a higher percentage of the spending budget of lower income persons are 
seen as a way of reducing the tax burden on these persons, and thus increasing their consumption 
capability. This argument is the rationale invoked for the application of reduced rates to food, 
medication, utilities, etc. 
The positive externalities rationale for reduced rates derives from a belief that the market price for 
some types of supplies does not fully reflect the overall benefits from consumption of those supplies 
for society as a whole, and thus government intervention to subsidise consumption of those goods is 
deemed desirable.  This argument is the rationale invoked for the application of reduced rates to 
books, cultural events, sports activities, etc. 
The job creation argument has been developed relatively recently, when compared with the other 
two rationales for the use of reduced VAT rates.  It derives from the belief that price decreases 
resulting from the introduction of reduced rates will lead to increase in demand, which in turn will 
result in increased supply.  In labour-intensive services that increased supply will necessarily lead to 
                                                            
86 It has been argued that VAT is regressive with respect to income but not necessarily with respect to 
consumption, see S. Cnossen, “The Value-added Tax: Key to a Better Tax Mix” (1989) Australian Tax Forum 
6(3), 265-281.  For a general discussion on the regressive nature of VAT, or otherwise, see also G.N. Carlson 
and M.K. Patrick, “Addressing the Regressivity of a Value-Added Tax” (1989) National Tax Journal 42(3), 339-
351; and N. Warren, ‘‘A Review of Studies on the Distributional Impact of Consumption Taxes in OECD 
Countries’’ (2008) OECD Social, Employment, and Migration Working Paper 64, June 2008, at 24. 
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new job creation.  This argument attained political endorsement within the EU in the late nineties, 
leading to the approval of the so-called labour-intensive services experiment in 1999. 
Crucially, these arguments – i.e. that application of reduced rates contributes to vertical equity, 
increases the consumption of merit products, and leads to job creation – presuppose that the 
decrease in the VAT rate is reflected in consumer prices.  Theoretically, this should indeed be the 
case: generally, in a competitive market if costs go down (including taxes), so should prices.   
However, recent empirical experiments with VAT rates seem to indicate the opposite.  The first and 
most significant has been the labour-intensive services experiment discussed above.  The second 
experiment to assess the impact of reduced rates on prices took place in Ireland.  Struggling with 
high levels of inflation, as a collateral effect of their outstanding economic growth, Ireland decided 
to reduce the standard VAT rate from 21% to 20% from January 2001.  In a speech in December 
2000, the Irish Finance Minister stated that: “The government expects to see the VAT reduction 
passed on to the consumer and not absorbed in higher retail margins.  If this does not occur, the 
wisdom of further VAT cuts will be placed in doubt.  We will be monitoring the situation and I hope 
consumers will be vigilant in seeing that the VAT reduction is passed on to them”.  In 2002, Ireland 
decided to raise back the rate of VAT from 20% to 21%.  In a speech in December 2001, the Finance 
Minister stated that the lower rate of VAT had not been passed on to consumers: “I had reservations 
about cutting that rate last year.  I said that I would be looking to see if it was fully passed on.  I am 
not convinced that this was the case.”87 
How to explain this discrepancy between theoretical and empirical results?  A convincing 
explanation has yet to be given.  A study published in 2008 has suggested that the empirical results 
of the labour-intensive services experiment might be due to its temporary nature, i.e. if firms know 
that a lower VAT rate is temporary, why would they use time and money to expand production 
capacity and incur costs if they have to revert to their previous production level within a few years.88  
It is also possible that, labour-intensive services do not operate in fully competitive markets,89 and 
that a decrease of 1% in the rate of VAT is too minimal to be passed on.  Finally, it is also worth 
noting that both experiments took place in a boom economy, where it is possible that demand 
outweighed supply.  Yet, these are merely tentative explanations: in practice, until definite 
arguments are presented all that can be said with certainty is that evidence so far does not support 
the argument that reduced VAT rates reduce prices. 
                                                            
87 See n. 20 above, at 26. 
88 See Copenhagen Economics, Study on reduced VAT applied to goods and services in the Member States of 
the European Union, Taxation Papers, Working Paper No. 13, 2008, at 13. 
89 For example, there might be geographical restrains, with only one hairdresser, or repair shop in a specific 
area. 
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The recent changes to VAT rate structures, which took place in various Member States since 2009, 
will offer new opportunities for assessing the incidence of VAT, and the impact of reduced rates on 
prices, in particular in the context of a downturn economy.90  In fact some initial examples, which 
took place in the beginning of the economic crisis, are already available, appearing to add support to 
the results of previous experiments.91  In 2009, France dropped the VAT rate from 19.6% to 5.5% for 
supplies of restaurant and catering services on the assumption that restaurants would reduce prices 
substantially, raise wages, or create new jobs, and improve compliance. However, according to the 
French National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies, the decrease in prices for restaurant 
services was not minimal – around 1% - but also temporary.  According to the French authorities, if 
only 30% of the VAT cut had been passed on to customer, this would create 6,000 jobs in the long 
run, but the government stood to lose up to €3 billion in revenue in a full fiscal year from the cut; 
this would equate to each new job in the sector costing French taxpayers €500,000.  In 2010 
Germany reduced the VAT rate applicable to the hotel industry as part of a more general tax cut.  A 
recent survey indicated that the cut had not been passed on to consumers, and instead prices had 
remained the same. 
If reduced VAT rates cannot reduce prices, then the logical conclusion is that they cannot attain the 
distributional and social aims that they are set up to achieve.  However, even if one assumes that the 
above empirical results are flawed, and that indeed reduced rates of VAT do affect prices, there are 
still no certainties that distributional and social aims are, or can be, reached.  A recent empirical 
study seems to indicate that the effectiveness of applying such rates depends on the elasticity of 
specific products: in the case of basic goods, such as food, consumers react only weakly to lower 
prices (where consumption is price in-elastic), so production and employment will not increase 
significantly; in contrast, if consumers react strongly to new prices, as in the case for high value 
goods, such as package holidays, books, and electronic equipment (where consumption is price 
elastic), production and employment may increase significantly.92  Moreover, other economic 
studies have consistently shown that since VAT is not an effective method of pursuing distributional 
goals, and it is far better to tax as broadly as possible,93 using the yield to compensate low-income 
                                                            
90 For early studies on the effects of the VAT temporary standard rate reduction in the UK in 2009 see T. 
Crossley et als, “The Economics of a Temporary VAT Cut” (2009) Fiscal Studies 30(1), 3-16; R. Barrel and M. 
Weale, “The Economics of a Reduction in VAT” (2009) Fiscal Studies 30(1), 17-30; and R. Blundell, “Assessing 
the Temporary VAT Cut Policy in the UK” (2009) Fiscal Studies 30(1), 31-38. 
91 See A. Charlet and J. Owens, “An International Perspective on VAT” (2010) Tax Notes International 59(12), 
943, at 950. 
92 See Copenhagen Economics, n. 88 above, at 12. 
93 C.L. Ballard and J.B. Shoven conclude that differentiation of rates used to partially replace the income tax 
would do little to mitigate the adverse distributional impact of the change, see “The Value-Added-Tax: The 
efficiency cost of achieving progressivity by using exemptions” in M.J. Boskin (ed.), Modern Development in 
Public Finance: Essays in Honor of Arnold Harberger (Oxford, B. Backwell, 1987), 109-129.  
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households.94  High-income households typically consume more of basic necessities than low-income 
households.  In this context, if items currently subject to reduced rates were fully taxed – personal 
income tax relief or means-tested social security benefits – the government could more effectively 
achieve social and distributional aims, and have additional revenue left over to apply to other 
redistributive programs.95  In this sense, lower income persons may be much worse off with a tax 
system that contains reduced VAT rates designed to assist them, than they would be in a tax system 
with one single rate and redistribution of the excess revenue raised under a more neutral tax base.  
In addition, job creation or protection of key sectors of the economy, would also be better achieved 
through direct subsidies. 
3.1.2 What are the costs of applying reduced VAT rates? 
The benefits of applying reduced VAT rates are therefore questionable.  Moreover, the costs of 
subsidising consumption of target goods and services in this manner are on the contrary likely to be 
significant. 
The most obvious cost is revenue loss, which is estimated to be substantial.  The VAT tax 
expenditures, as calculated by the OECD for 2007 on the basis of countries’ tax expenditures reports 
and responses to a questionnaire targeted at OECD delegates, was very significant.  In at least three 
EU Member States – namely Italy, Spain and the UK – the revenue forgone from those expenditures 
amounted to more than 1/3 of total VAT revenues.96  It is of course true that not all those 
expenditures are connected with the application of reduced rates, many will be related to the 
application of exemptions.  It is also true that the amount of revenue forgone may not be exactly 
equal to the revenue that would be actually obtained if the tax expenditures were eliminated and 
the standard rate of VAT was to be applied; it is likely that consumption will somewhat contract, 
depending on the price elasticities of the products in question.  However, the estimates on the level 
of VAT tax expenditures present in EU Member States does provide a rough indication of the 
revenue costs of applying reduced rates in those countries.  Another method of estimating the 
revenue cost of applying reduced rates (and exemptions) is the so-called VAT Revenue Ratio (VRR), 
which expresses the revenue that would be raised if the standard VAT rate was applied to all 
consumption.  Using this method, the OECD estimates that, between half and 1/3 of potential 
revenues of its member countries are not subject to VAT or, if they are, are not collected.97 
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Beyond the estimated revenue losses, however, applying reduced rates of VAT raises significant 
other costs.  From a legal perspective application of reduced rates gives rise to definitional and 
interpretative problems, and constitute an incentive to engage in aggressive tax planning.  For these 
reasons reduced rates tend to result in substantial – and increasing – litigation, which in turn results 
in substantial compliance and administrative costs.98 
Symptomatic of this increase in litigation is the number of cases brought before the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU) in relation to the application of reduced rates by Member States to 
various goods and services.99  At stake in many of these cases was the application of reduced rates to 
specific products, whilst other similar products were subject to standard rates.  The Court has 
consistently emphasised the importance of respecting the principle of fiscal neutrality: the 
application of reduced rates to certain products must be consistent with this principle that precludes 
treating similar goods, which are therefore in direct competition with each other, differently for VAT 
purposes. In a recent case concerning exemptions the Court has gone further in application of the 
principle of fiscal neutrality by stating that Member States cannot apply different VAT treatments to 
services that are comparable to each other from the point of view of the customer or meet the same 
needs of the customer.100  Following this decision the debate has been on whether the new criteria 
will have implications for the Court approach to VAT rates structures.  Some have already been 
defending that it will, stating that it is “highly likely” that the criteria laid down in Rank Group will 
affect the application of VAT rates, particularly to food.101  The big test should come soon with the 
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eagerly expected decisions in the e-books cases, where the Court has been called to decide on 
whether e-books can be subject to reduced rates of VAT similarly to hardcopy books.102   
In the meantime, national courts too have been struggling with similar difficulties, and in this regard, 
United Kingdom court cases concerning food products are particularly telling.103  In addition to 
highlighting definitional and interpretative difficulties, these rulings also demonstrate the pitfalls of 
attempting to attain distributional and social aims through reduced rates: certain food products 
were excluded from the scope of application of the reduced rates because the UK legislator deemed 
these products as not fulfilling those distributional and social aims; yet, similar products are 
benefiting from reduced rates; the result being that the tax system is de facto subsidising those 
products, in detriment of competing products.  The consequences for fiscal neutrality are obvious: 
treating competing products differently for VAT purposes is bound to create distortions to 
competition.  In addition there might be unexpected detrimental effects: some decisions, for 
example, would have been likely to create an incentive to alter the manufacturing of their products 
in order to benefit from a reduced rate. 
Whilst difficult to quantify, the costs of these distortions of consumption and investment decisions 
may be extremely significant.  Reduced rates of VAT erode the tax base, and importantly may 
subsidise inefficient production – since the suppliers of products subject to reduced rates do not 
have to compete on a level playing field with suppliers of products subject to standard.  The results 
of the cost-benefit analysis as applied to reduced VAT rates is therefore particularly negative: not 
only it is unclear whether they accomplish any of the social and distributional objectives that they 
set out to achieve, but they also carry significant costs beyond the mere loss of potential revenue.104  
The result is a significant decrease in efficiency of the tax, as measured by the IMF and the OECD, 
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which shows that European countries’ VAT systems tend to rank below the OECD C-efficiency ratio, 
average, which stands at 55 points out of 100 possible.105 
The ideal VAT – at least insofar as higher income countries are concerned – is therefore thought to 
be a broad-based, single rate tax.106  This much has been consistently defended by the OECD since 
the 1980s,107 and was recently supported by the European Commission in the 2010 Green Paper on 
the Future of VAT.  This has also been the position of the IMF, which has recommended the 
introduction of a single-rate VAT system to many countries around the world.108 
3.1.3 What is the ideal VAT (standard) rate? 
The idea that tax revenue increases as tax rate increases only up to a certain level – the maximum 
tax rate – and that from that point onwards increases in the tax rate actually lead to a decrease in 
tax revenue, was first suggested in 1970s.109  Whether this u-shape effect, known as the Laffer 
Curve, applies to VAT is not an uncontested matter.  Empirical evidence suggests that rate increases 
does result in, both a decrease in average propensity for consumption – or at least a decrease in the 
formal economy –, and an increase in non-compliance / fraud, i.e. an increase in activities in the 
informal economy.110  Whether those effects do result in the existence of maximum rate in terms of 
revenue maximisation, however, is less clear. 
Prior to 2008 it was suggested that indeed there was a revenue maximising rate for VAT, which 
stood at a range between 18% and 19.3% in EU countries;111 more recently, it has been estimated 
the VAT maximising revenue rate in those countries to be 22.5%.112  It is also suggested that the 
maximum rate is different according to business cycle, i.e. that it is slightly higher in low growth 
years – this would be explained with changes in the structure of consumption, as well as with VAT 
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collection effectiveness.113  However, both studies have shortcomings.114  Moreover, latest evidence 
indicates that, if there is a VAT Laffer Curve, the maximising revenue rate has not yet been achieved 
in EU countries, with Member States still reporting increases in VAT revenue intakes, despite the 
increase in rates to unprecedented levels. 
Whether increasing rates is the most effective way to increase VAT revenues, nevertheless, is an 
entirely different question.  As discussed above, whilst most EU Member States increased their 
standard rates in the last 5 years, only a relatively small number extended their VAT base.  Yet, 
empirical evidences demonstrates the most effective and immediate driver of changes in VAT 
revenues is base-broadening; changes in the standard rate, in contrast, directly account for a 
relatively small part of the development in VAT revenues.115  Moreover, increases in standard VAT 
rates may potentially amplify the difficulties and distortions caused by reduced rates, if it widens the 
gap between the two. 
The ideal VAT is thought therefore, not only to be broad-based, with a single rate tax, but equally 
that rate should also be low. Unfortunately, such a VAT rate structure would be extremely difficult – 
if not impossible – to implement in European countries. So the question is, what would constitute an 
improved, achievable, VAT rate structure in Europe. 
3.2. Achievable VAT rate structure 
In light of the above, any reform of national VAT rate structures with a view to having a significantly 
improved structure, must take in consideration various factors.  First, it must be acknowledged that, 
in the immediate term, moving products from reduced to standard rate is likely to have a significant 
economic impact, namely in the context of the high standard rates applied in almost all Member 
States, which mean that this move could represent as much as a 20% or 15% tax hike.  This economic 
impact could be reflected in higher prices, which would hit the poorest households the hardest, or in 
increased unemployment / low salaries: one can imagine that in price inelastic sectors, such as food 
or utilities, prices will most likely increase;116 in other price elastic sectors, where an increase in price 
might lead to a considerable contraction in consumption, suppliers may opt to maintain prices, but 
will need instead to decrease costs, which in a labour-intensive sector, such as restaurant services or 
tourism, would lead to job loses. 
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Secondly, it must be accepted that in the current financial environment that most European 
countries find themselves in – and not just the ones which benefited from a bail-out agreement – in 
the context of problematic budget deficits, and significant financial restrains, the likelihood of 
introduction of measures at personal income tax or social security level, to compensate the VAT 
hike, is small at best.  This concern was indeed expressed by several respondents to the European 
Commission’s latest public consultation on review of reduced rates: in the current economic climate 
respondents expressed fear that there might be no national compensating measures, or that they 
would be insufficient.117 
Third, any reform of nationals VAT rate structures must take into consideration EU law limitations.  
As opposed to exemptions, application of reduced rates under the VAT Directive is non-compulsory, 
i.e. the Directive establishes maximum standards of differentiation – number of rates, number of 
products to which reduced rates can be applied – but does not establish a minimum level of 
differentiation; Member States are free to apply reduced rates to as limited number of products as 
they wish, and ad extremis are even free to apply only one rate.  Therefore extension of the VAT 
base through elimination of reduced rates is not subject to any EU law limitations.  However, the 
implementation of compensatory measures may be; in particular, the freedom to introduce 
measures to compensate labour-intensive or key economic sectors for the increase in VAT rates in 
might be severely reduced.  Within the EU, national subsidies to specific industries, either in the 
form of tax relief / incentives or direct subsidies, are limited by state aid law.118 
Finally, the long-running history of European failed attempts to harmonise VAT rate structures, is 
indicative of the political difficulties in reforming this area of the tax system.  Aside from the well-
known specific European dynamics at force, such unanimity voting – which can be bypassed by 
national, unilateral action – it must also be acknowledged that opposition to reform in this area may 
be partially explained by the theory of status quo bias, which lies behind the opposition to abolition 
of preferential tax regimes more generally.119 
In light of the above limitations, what would be suitable criteria for better, more efficient, more 
neutral, yet achievable, European VAT rate structures? 
3.2.1 Criteria for Reform of European VAT Rate Structures 
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In terms of the VAT base, four criteria are proposed, as follows. 
Criterion 1: Elimination of application of reduced rates of VAT, where the rationale for its application 
is the creation of positive externalities and/or correction of externalities.  There are various 
arguments to support this criterion. First, it is notoriously difficult (and subjective) to attach positive 
externalities to specific products; for example, few may argue against the positive externalities of 
reading, yet do all books or magazines hold positive externalities? Do celebrities’ biographies, or 
astrology books?  And even if so, are these potential positive externalities sufficient to justify a 
government subsidy? Different people will hold different views.  Second, goods or services which are 
usually perceived as holding positive externalities, such as books or cultural events, are statistically 
much more likely to be consumed by high-income households.  So that applying reduced rates to 
these products constitutes a de facto subsidy from poor-income to high-income households, thus 
holding negative distributional effects.  It has been argued that the maintenance of reduce rates for 
these products has an aspirational value.  Even if that is the case, is it legitimate to ask low-income 
households to subsidise attendance to theatre plays, or the opera, by high-income households?  
Third, these products are by nature price elastic, so it is unclear to what extent prices will be 
affected by a VAT rate increase.  It is possible that they will be an effect on employment, in the 
context of a possible need to decrease costs, but it is worth keeping in mind that these are not 
usually labour-intensive industries for unqualified workers, but quite the opposite: they tend to 
employ small number of qualified workers.  Finally, in the context of the current financial and 
economic crisis, encouraging the consumption of products which hold positive externalities is hardly 
a priority. 
Criterion 2: Maintaining the application of reduced rates of VAT where the rationale for is application 
is vertical equity.  The basis for this criterion is the low price elasticity of these products; prices will 
most likely increase, hitting low-income households hardest.  However, given that high-income 
households consume considerably more of these products, it makes sense to limit the application of 
reduce rates to those categories of goods and services which are truly essential, such as food. 
Criterion 3: Maintaining the application of reduced rates of VAT where its elimination would have a 
serious impact on industries which are either labour-intensive or key for economic recovery.  The 
arguments in favour of maintaining reduced rates for these sectors are based on keeping 
competitiveness of national products in the international market, and employment concerns.  In 
principle the tax hike could be absorbed by suppliers by decrease in their margins, but considering 
the size of the hike it is likely that at least part of the increase will have to be passed on to 
consumers in higher prices, or to employees in lower salaries / job losses.  Both options carry 
economic risks for key sectors of the economy and those which are labour-intensive: if passed on in 
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higher prices there is a risk of decrease competitiveness for exporting sectors of the economy, which 
in labour-intensive sectors can have the added effect of raising unemployment; even for non-
exporting sectors, if price elastic, it is more likely that the VAT hike would be passed on employees, 
as increase in prices would lead to contraction in consumption, and then again there would be a 
significant risk of job losses. 
Criterion 4: Rationalisation of categories of goods and services to which reduced rates of VAT apply, 
by eliminating distinctions within categories, and limiting the use of different rates to different 
products within the same category.  Distinctions within categories are the main sources of 
interpretative and definitional difficulties; elimination of these distinctions would therefore lead to 
higher legal certainty, be a disincentive to planning, abuse and fraud, and decrease significantly the 
potential for litigation – all of which would in turn result in lower compliance and administrative 
costs.  Elimination of distinctions would also avoid other economic distortions, such as product 
manipulation so as to avail of the reduce VAT rate. 
3.2.2 How to Reform European VAT Rate Structures 
Whilst the economic case for VAT base-broadening has been often done by the European 
Commission –and many academics – the persuasiveness of the economic case has clearly been 
insufficient to secure political support.  As discussed above, this is undoubtedly partially due to the 
difficulties in approving EU legislation; however, EU legislative procedure dynamics alone do not 
explain the fact that, until recently, VAT base broadening measures have also been relatively rare at 
national European level.  A better explanation for it may be the existence of status quo bias. 
Broadening the VAT base means essentially moving from an existing tax regime, towards a new one; 
adoption of such measures requires, therefore, overcoming the status quo bias.  This bias means 
that voters will impose more conditions to move from status quo A to a new tax system B, than to 
remain in A.120  The bias can be explained by creation of losers and winners, uncertainty, and 
imperfect information. Any tax reform process necessarily results in losers and winners, and 
broadening of VAT is no exception. Those that had been so far benefiting from the existence of 
reduced rates will naturally loose with the reform; they are easily identifiable, compared to the 
second group of most taxpayers that stand to gain (perhaps only marginally), and they have a strong 
incentive to lobby hard against the reform, in contrast with the winners, who are often silent.121  
Additionally, the reform process itself may create uncertainty, which will be aggravated by voters’ 
lack of understanding of the tax system (imperfect information).  On VAT specifically, it has been 
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suggested that the main cause of the unpopularity of broadening-base measures is the imperfect 
information on the potential revenue and redistributional impact of these base-broadening 
measures.122 
The status quo bias means in practice that a pure economic argument, focussing on efficiency gains, 
may not be sufficient to obtain the political agreement necessary for the adoption of VAT base-
broadening measures, according to the above proposed criteria.  Overcoming this bias may require 
EU Member States to consider others factors regarding the form and timing of the reform. 
In terms of form, it has been suggested as a solution to circumventing the status quo bias, to pursue 
gradual reforms, by splitting the reform intro different components, and to explicitly link the 
abolition of preferential tax treatments that only benefit some taxpayers – such as application of 
reduced rates to specific products – with the introduction of tax measures from which most 
taxpayers will gain.123  As discussed above,124 both these approaches have been tried within the EU 
for the reform of VAT rates, with no success.  More promising is the suggestion that base broadening 
measures may be more acceptable if bundled; when elements are viewed in isolation, and the 
debate focus on particular goods, the status quo may be seen as genuinely redistributive, which may 
prevent voters from supporting the reform.125  The EU experience seems to confirm this view.  
Moreover, international constraints, such as those emerging from the IMF or the European 
Commission, may also assist in the introduction of unpopular reforms,126 as the experience post-
2008 in countries subject to bail-out demonstrates. 
Insofar as timing for the introduction of base broadening measures, whilst it is difficult to definite 
the right moment, quick reforms appear to be the most effective.127  Not only there is a possibility 
that the announcement might change the behaviour of economic operators,128 but equally it may 
encourage the mobilisation of those that will lose out with the reform to lobby (harder) for the 
maintenance of the status quo. 
3.2.3 Portuguese 2012 VAT Reform 
The above proposed base-broadening criteria were used as a basis for the Portuguese VAT rate 
structure reform in 2012, which through strategic designed form and timing was able to overcome 
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the status quo bias.  Under the bail-out agreement signed with the EU and the IMF in 2011, Portugal 
was required to reform its VAT, which was deemed to be highly inefficient and if reformed offered 
potential to help the Portuguese Government reduce its budget deficit.  The required reform, based 
on the above criteria, was implemented in the 2012 State Budget, and it resulted in the following 
key changes to the existing rate structure: 
(1) Cultural events, sports activities and environmentally friendly products were moved from the 
reduced and intermediate rates to the standard rate (on the basis of criterion 1). 
(2) Non-essential food and beverages, take-away and restaurant services were moved from the 
reduced and intermediate rates to the standard rate (on the basis of criterion 2). 
(3) Hotel accommodation and tourism-related services, as well as agricultural inputs have been 
kept at reduced and intermediate rates (on the basis of criterion 3). 
(4) Distinctions within categories of foodstuff have been eliminated, so that specific categories are 
either subject to reduced or to standard rates (on the basis of criterion 4). 
The reform resulted in a 30 points reduction in tax expenditure, as well as a significant increase in 
the C-efficiency level, which before the reform stood at 44 points.129  Consumption contracted 
significantly; however, until reliable price data is available, it is difficult to dissociate the extent to 
which the contraction resulted from the VAT base broadening, from the contraction that it would 
have happen as a result of the economic and financial crisis regardless of any tax hikes.  
Consequently VAT revenue has increased, but at lower levels than expected. 
Despite the somewhat disappointing short-term results in terms of revenue collected, the 
Portuguese reform of the VAT rate structure was broadly complimented by the EU and the IMF.  The 
IMF Country Report on Portugal at the time of the reforms stated that as a result of these the VAT 
tax base levied at the standard rates was enlarged from 60 to 80% of the total base, which would 
generate savings of about 1.2% of GDP.130  The report from the European Commission referred to 
additional revenues of 1.4% of GDP, stating: 
“Following past increases in the VAT rates, the 2012 budget focused mostly on broadening the 
tax base […] In order to protect vulnerable groups, many essential goods remain subject to the 
6% reduced rate and this rate also continues to be applied to goods considered crucial for 
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domestic production, such as wine. Overall, the measures will help to significantly increase VAT 
efficiency.”131 
The success of these measures – even if more limited than expected – allowed the Portuguese 
Government to focus on introducing amendments to the VAT legislation to promote growth, in 
particular by helping small and medium-sized businesses, in the 2013 State Budget. Measures 
introduced included the simplification of the bad debts regime, and a cash-flow tax accounting 
scheme for companies with turnover below €500,000. 
 
4. Achieving Broad-Based VAT(s) in Europe 
EU agreement on reduced VAT rates is difficult to achieve; and even if achievable, it will result in 
only minor improvements to the current EU VAT rate structure. In this context it is necessary to 
consider whether it would be possible to have significantly improved VAT rate structures in Europe, 
through national, uncoordinated, action. Implementation of an ideal VAT by Member States – i.e. a 
single-rate system with compensatory measures low-income households, and key sectors of the 
economy – is conditioned by political constrains present in most European countries, as well as 
significant budgetary limitations.  Moreover, the form and timing of the reform is not indifferent, the 
presence of status quo bias means that EU Member States must consider the best strategy to 
overcome that bias. 
The criteria proposed here for reform of national VAT rate structures will not result in the best VAT 
possible, but rather in the best VAT Member States can possible have given the circumstances.  A 
broader-based VAT, which will result in increased revenue, decreased administrative and compliance 
costs, and less susceptibility to fraud, avoidance and planning; overall a more efficient, more neutral 
VAT.  In the process the holy grail of EU VAT might be finally attained: decreased divergence and 
even approximation of VAT rates structures across the EU.  Not through a process of EU 
harmonisation, but instead through a process of natural convergence of national VAT policies – a 
rare case of significant gain, with limited pain. 
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